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Since World V^ar II , the Navy has relied upon volunteer enlistments to
maintain its force structure. However, it is recognized that many men
were motivated to enlist by the prospect of being drafted into the Army.
Now that the All-Volunteer Force policy is in effect for all services
,
there is speculation that the quality of new Naval recruits will diminish.
This paper makes a quality comparison of enlistees under the Draft Lottery
system and enlistees under the All-Volunteer Force policy from data
obtained in the Monterey Peninsula, California area of the Eighth Naval
Recruiting District. The results indicate that no significant change in
quality has occurred during the first four months of the All-Volunteer
policy. The implications are that 1) no reduction in the quality of new
enlistees is a good indication that the Navy is maintaining a quality
status quo, and 2) no increasing trend in quality might reflect the
effectiveness of the Navy's program to enlist the highest caliber of
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I. INTRODUCTION
The major objective of this study is the comparison, in quality, of
Naval enlistees under the draft lottery and draft -free environments
based on recruiting data obtained in the Monterey Peninsula, California
area of the Eighth Naval Recruiting District.
This study was motivated by the author's interest in the projection
(Objection 8, Gates 1970) that a degradation in enlistee quality would
occur under an All-Volunteer Force policy. In a time of changing
quality requirements (Discussed in Part I of this thesis), this author
hoped that changes in enlistee quality could be detected, if such
changes are occuring.
Although other studies of enlistee quality have developed concerns
over the recruiting of quality enlistees under the All-Volunteer Force
policy, these studies have had to identify the "true volunteer" under
the draft system in order to make comparisons between volunteers and
draftees. This study may be the first using "actual volunteer" data.
Previous studies, for example Valentine and Vitola (1970), found
that the mean AFQT (68.66) of a draft-motivated enlistee was 13.16 above
that of a "true volunteer" enlistee. This mean difference yielded a
significant statistic of 6.58. This difference is discouraging when one
considers the percentages of men in Mental Ability categories I 6 II
serving in the Navy's most technical ratings. Reaume and Oi (1970)
found that 81.6% in the Electronics Repair ratings, and 69.5% in
Communications Intelligence ratings were in Mental Ability categories
I 6 II as of 31 March 1959. Replacement of these technical people in
the future may also be difficult. A study by Lockman, Stoloff, and

Allbritton (1972) showed that although volunteers are more career
motivated than draft-motivated enlistees , enlistees with career intentions
have lower entrance educational levels. They found that the mean formal
entry education of a first term rated man was 12.4 years as compared v/ith
the 11.2 years of a second term man, and 10.8 years of a third term man
with less than sixteen years of active duty.
Minimum Mental Standards for enlistment have increased from the 1951
minimum AFQT score of 10, through the 1967 standards of High School
graduate (AFQT 16-30) and non-High School graduate (AFQT 16-30) plus
minimum multiple-cut off scores in other Battery exams (Sullivan 1970).
Finally in July 1973 it was stipulated that 90% of all assessions must
be school (Class 'A') eligible with the exception that all minority non-
school eligible enlistments must be approved by higher authority, and in
addition, all non-High School graduates must have a confirmed Odds for
Effectiveness (OFF) score of 72 or greater (NRDSFRANNOTE 1130 JUN 73).
If the required quantity of volunteer assessions can be fulfilled using
these criteria, one would expect to see an increasing mean entry mental
qualification score.
It was shown by Sullivan (1970) that the New Standards (Project
100,000, Category IV) enlistees to March 1969 had not demonstrated the
advancement potential needed to meet leadership replacement requirements.
After 19-21 months total service time, the New Standards personnel were
distributed in the following pay grades: E-1 (.8%), E-2 (32.5%), E-3
(65.8%), E-4 (.9%), and E-5 (0%). In comparison with the Control Group
(Categories I, II, III) personnel distribution of: E-1 (0%), E-2 (2.U%),
E-3 (50.1%), E-4 (1+5.9%), and E-5 (1.6%), there is a considerable differ-
ence, particularly in the E-2 and E-4 levels. This might indicate that
entry standards will have to remain above the Mental Ability IV level
,

under the All-Volunteer policy, in order to obtain the quality of man
needed in future leadership assignments.
Because all of the studies available dealt with the quality of
enlistees prior to the commencement of the no-draft environment , the
author of this thesis decided to gather what data he could in order to
examine the impact of the no-draft policy on the quality of the recruits
coming into the U.S. Navy. The author realizes full well that the data
he presents here do not provide an adequate treatment of all the pertinent
issues; however, they do represent what may be the first attempt to
address the question of what is happening to recruit quality under the
All-Volunteer Force environment.
This thesis is organized into four parts. In Part I, the quality
requirements of today's modern Navy through a brief discussion of the
evolution of historical and technological change is developed. Part II
contains the data and the statistical analysis to examine enlistee
quality under the draft lottery system and under the current All-
Volunteer Force policy. Test data are enlistees' General Classification
Test, Arithmetic Test, and Mechanical Test scores combined into a GAM
score made in the periods January through April of 1971, 1972, and 1973.
In Part III, the results and the implications of the study are discussed.
Part IV, the conclusion, contains a summation of the study, several
related comments, and some implications for the Navy.
The technique used in this study compared the mean GAM scores of
enlistees' during the two periods (draft and non-draft). The avail-
ability of only GAM scores renders this a basic preliminary survey.
However, because of the newness of the All-Volunteer Force policy, other
types of data by which comparisons could be made were not available.
Unfortunately, it was also necessary to assume that all of the enlistees

of the 1971 and 1972 time span were draft-motivated, although other
studies (Rhode 1972 and Lockman 1972) found that approximately fifty-
five percent and sixty three percent, respectively, of the Navy enlistees
were "true volunteers".

II, THE EVOLUTION OF QUALITY STANDARDS
FOR NAVAL ENLISTMENTS
It would be wrong to assume that the Navy of yesteryear was looking
for men of lesser quality than that of the Navy of 1973. However, the
able body seaman of the 1800' s, requiring only physical stamina and
mental character to adapt to rigid disciplinary control, was recruited
under standards much different than those necessary today.
This country, still young in its development of uniform standards of
educational requirements and opportunities in the 1800 *s, was charac-
terized by people of heterogeneous ethnic and national backgrounds who
had recently immigrated to the United States . As a result , the enlistees
from this population often resulted in ships' crews consisting of men
speaking only their old-country language, such as French, German, Spanish,
Italian, and even occasionally Chinese. (Roloff 1956)
As late as 1922, physical standards were being used as a primary
means of controlling the number of enlistments. Physical standards were
raised that year to prevent the young men who were substandard physically
from joining the Navy. Two years before, when quotas were not being
filled, physical requirements had been considerably lowered. (Roloff
1956)
The period between World War I and World War II was characterized
by a definite increase in educational quality standards for prospective
Navy enlistees. By 1929 the mental caliber of recruits reached its
highest level up to that time. The average recruit had nine years and
four months of schooling to his credit. (Roloff 1956)
The onslaught of the depression in the 1930 's boosted reenlistment

rates to over eighty-five percent and first enlistirient opportunities
dropped drastically to a lov; of one in thirty applicants being accepted.
The recruiter's situation was one of having stringent and high standards;
selectivity was easy because the supply of recruits exceeded the Navy's
needs. The results of this selectivity were reflected in the recognized
excellence of the enlisted forces in the years immediately preceding
World War II. Of course the Navy's manpower needs changed after
December 7, 1941, and during the following four years over three and
one-half million men and nearly one hundred thousand women were enlisted
to meet the demands of World War II. (Roloff 1956)
World War II taught the lesson that the Navy must recognize skill
specialization as a prominent factor in its existence and its success
.
By 1950 the enlisted rating structiire was established essentially the
way it remains today, and the personnel selection program based on
aptitude and knowledge tests was developed . From these tests , the
Applicant Qualification Test (AQT) and Navy Basic Test Battery which
consists of the General Classification Test (GCT), Arithmetic Test (ARI),
Clerical Aptitude Test (CLER) , and Mechanical Test (MECH), Navy Standard
Scores were established and an appropriate single score or a combination
of scores was devised for minimum acceptable requirements for entry into
the Navy, and its various job-related schools. And, as is the case today,
each individual applicant was personally interviewed and the interviewer's
recommendation accompanied and influenced the final selections (NAVPERS
10827 JAN 191+9).
The rapid acceleration of warfare technology during the war, and the
postwar developments of refined radar and fire-control systems , nuclear
propulsion and nuclear ordnance, and the ever increasing complexity of
computerized missile and antimissile systems, quite naturally demand a
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higher trained and more trainable enlistee. The electronics/technical
field of ratings within the Navy comprised 18.5 percent of all ratings
in 1945, 30 percent in 1969, and is projected at 37 percent in 1974.
(Sullivan 1970). In addition to this, Sullivan (1970) stresses three
other reasons for maintaining high enlistment standards. The first of
these, cheaper training, reflects the contention that higher quality
recruits learn faster and experience lower attrition rates in formal
schooling, and even if low-quality recruits are capable of assimilating
technical knowledge, the costs of training them is higher. The tradeoff
here, of course, is that it is harder and more expensive to procure only
high-quality recruits. The next point, fewer disciplinary problems, also
represents an economic challenge. Recruits with lower mental capabilities
are more likely to be involved in serious disciplinary problems resulting
in an increase cost of the associated legal, control, and administrative
functions. Staffing non-commissioned officer billets, the last item, is
a problem of having enough quality replacements to move up through rates.
Lower quality recruits are less likely to be eligible for reenlistment
or promotion.
The latest figures representing the current trend in Naval
Recruiting are reflected in the following three quotations from the Navy
Recruiting SITREP of 15 July 1973 which was published by the United States
Navy Recruiting Command:
"A major problem area in enlisted recruiting programs for FY-74 will
be six year programs - Nuclear Field (attained 5,172 or 99.9% of
FY-73 goal), and Advanced Electronics Field (attained 3,415 or 75.3%
of FY-73 goal)."
"A comparison of recruiting statistics for all services during Fiscal
Year 1973 (1 July 1972 - 30 June 1973), shows that despite massive
effort by all hands , Navy finished fourth in percentage attainment
of goals:
GOAL ATTAINMENT % OF GOAL MG IV HS GRAD
Navy (USN 99.870 91,690 91.8% 15.6% 69.2%
11

" In June , for the third consecutive month, Navy and Naval Reserve
recruiting goals were missed. Despite the highest June accession
goal in eighteen years, the seriousness of the shortfall is shovm
below."
GOAL ATTAINMENT % OF GOAL
USN 14200 8387 59.1%
USNR 1579 769 48.7%
It should be noted that the first two statements cover the entire
Fiscal Year 1973 v^hich contains the time span of concern in this study,
12

III. PRESENTATION OF DATA
Because the use of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) was
discontinued on 1 January 1973 (NRDSFRANNOTE 1130, 26 DEC 72), the GCT,
ARI, and MECH scores \iere combined (G+A+M) to form the GAM score used as
the measure of enlistee quality. In addition, paragraph 4 of the above
referenced Notice directed the use of the Conversion Table at Mental
Group Levels (Appendix B) and the GAM/AFQT relationships (Appendix A)
to determine future placement of potential enlistees in a Mental Ability
category.
The sam.ple of scores obtained for the comparison consists of the
entire record of actual first term Regular Navy enlistees from the
Monterey, Salinas, and Gilroy, California Naval Recruiting Stations.
The data collected were for the periods January through April of the years
1971, 1972, and 1973. These time frames were selected because they
represented the effective beginning of the All-Volunteer Force policy in
1973, and the corresponding periods of the previous two years when the
draft lottery system was still in effect. Lack of documentation of each
subject's reason for desiring to enlist force the assumption that all
enlistees of 1972 and 1971 were draft-motivated. This assumption, as
previously noted, may be in error (in frequency terms) by as much as
fifty percent. Sufficient personal data (birth dates) were not available
to allow draft lottery information to be used to determine draft motiva-
tion. (Lower draft lottery numbers would be inferred as meaning high
draft motivation). Overall, however, the aforementioned assumption is
rather unimportant for this thesis, as this thesis is primarily directed
at comparing enlistees procured since the All-Volunteer Force environment
13

began with enlistees obtained during the draft environment. The extent
to which the draft era data were influenced by the scores of "true
volunteers" is of course interesting, but it is not crucial to this
thesis.
Comparisons between the two groups ' test performance were made
through the t statistic analysis utilizing the null hypothesis that the
mean GAM scores for the two periods (January- April 1973 for the All-
Volunteer Force and January-April 1971 & 1972 for the Draft Lottery
System) were equal.
For further analysis and comparison, the data were divided by Mental
Ability Category for the two periods (Table III), and further divided
by Mental Ability Category (Table IV) for each respective recruiting
station. These analyses were made in an attempt to detect any pattern
which would indicate a particular area as a soxirce of one caliber (mental
group) of recruit. In addition, the total number of examinations adminis-
tered in the corresponding time frames were tabulated as an indication of
the recruit supply curve for the two periods
.
A final data sample was obtained from the Eighth Recruiting District
Headquarters in San Francisco. This sample consisted of scores made from
January - April 1973 by thirty randomly selected candidates for the
Advanced Electronics Field (AEF) /Nuclear Field (NF) programs.
These means are presented in Table II. The purpose of this sample was
to determine the caliber of individuals presently being considered for




Table I summarizes the performance of the two groups on the combined
GAM tests. It is again noted that the draft-motivated group scores are
tainted with some percentage of "true volunteer" input (presumably with
GAM capability than draft -motivated enlistees of the same group (Rhode
1970). The influence this has had on the data is indeterminable.
Table I. Mean Scores on Combined GAM by Self-













Monterey 169.02 18.0 161.33 13.8 -7.69 1.34
Salinas 158.02 17.9 161.17 15.5 + 3.15 .568
Gilroy 159.60 17.1 161.46 14.2 +1.86 .327
All Stations 162.83 16.4 161.32 13.9 -1.51 .487
*Mean Difference = All-Volunteer Mean - Draft Lottery Group Mean
The test statistics definitely indicated no statistically significant
change in recruit quality level. Thus, one cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the two sets of recruits came from populations having the
same mean.
Table II shows the mean score comparison of the Draft Lottery, All-
Volunteer, and the sample AEF/NF groups.
Table II. Mean Scores on Combined GAM by Self-



















"'Mean Difference = AEF/NF Group - Draft Lottery or All-Volunteer Group Mean
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It is readily apparent from the test statistics in Table II that
the mean of the scores obtained by the AEF/NF enlistees is significantly
higher than those presented in Table I, This is what the Navy would
want; the data in Table II are presented to illustrate the magnitude of
difference between the highly sought after technical field recruit and
the average recruit . True , the Navy does not need all technical field
people, but the mean score of recruits into the Navy should have an
upward trend and not decrease or remain stable if the Navy is attempting
to obtain a greater percentage of higher quality recruits.
Tables III and IV depict the breakdo^-m, by Mental Ability Category,
of the two groups combined and by recruiting station, respectively.
Table III. Combined Percentage/Numerical Distribution of Self-
Motivated and Draft-Motivated Enlistee Groups by Mental Ability
Category
Draft-:Mot Group Self-Mot Group National Mean
Mental Ability (N=125) (N== 37) Pert
All
rentage for
Category N % N % Enlistees""
I 9 7.2 1 2.7 7
II 52 41.6 16 43.2 24
Ilia 38 30.4 13 35.2
38(IIIa £ b)
Illb 20. 16.0 7 18.9
IV 6 4.8 24
V 7
Total 125 100 37 100 100
*Cat V not eligible for enlistment ""NAVPERS 15812B dtd OCT 1970
The percentage data in Table III shows no major difference between
the draft and non-draft (self-motivated) enlistees. Furthermore, a
Chi-Square test statistic of 3.31 (df=4. Cat. V not included) indicates
no significant dependence between the data groups and the Mental Ability
16

categories. When compared with the 77.1% of "true volunteers" in the
I, II, Ilia categories for the period JAN-OCT 1970 (Rhode 1972), the
Chi-Square test further substantiates the probable bias of "true
volunteers" in the Draft-Motivated data. In addition, the data do indi-
cate that the entire Monterey Peninsula area is an above average source
of category II and III personnel.
Table IV. Recruiting Station Numerical Distribution of Self-














Mot Grp Mot Grp
'71 '72 '73
I 2 3 2 ;'j 1 1
II 8 13 7 11 12 5 jV 7 4
Ilia 5 3 2 14 8 4 i't 8 7
lllb 2 1 3 7 8 3 :: 2 1
IV 2 2 * 2
yii-k A
Total i7 19 12 37 30 12 s'c 20 13
'"'Station not open at this time
**Category V Personnel are not eligible to enlist
The distributions- by Mental Ability category, as shown in Table IV,
basically remain proportionately equal for each recruiting area. The
major difference is in the reduction in total numbers of enlistees in
1973 for all groups and locations. The combined tabulation of enlistments







Table V. Total Examinations Administered (JAN - APR)





*Station not open at this time
Table V shows the total examinations administered by each recruiting
station during the evaluation period. These data do not correspond with
the actual enlistees (Table VI) of the same period used in the preceding
analysis. However, since each subject who approaches a naval recruiter
as a potential enlistee is examined, this serves as an indication of the
potential recruit supply over the three periods.
Table VI. Total Regular Enlistees (JAN - APR)





*Station not open at this time
It can be seen that the supply of applicants in the areas studied
has dropped to some extent, but not as much as the enlistee total has
dropped (Table VI), in percentage terms. The drop in the number of
enlistees for 1973 (Table VI) may be best accounted for by current
recruiting quota restrictions and by high standards limitations. These







V, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to compare self-motivated and draft-
motivated recruits in an effort to detect any early trend in recruit
quality under the All-Volunteer Force policy. Objection 8, of The
Report of the Presidents Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force
(Gates 1970), projected that:
A voluntary force will be less effective because not enough highly
qualified youths will likely to enlist and pursue military careers.
As the quality of servicemen declines , the prestige and dignity
of the services will also decline and further intensify recruiting
problems.
The rebuttal to this objection countered with:
The Commission has been impressed by the number and quality of the
individuals who, despite conscription, now choose a career in the
military.
...The Commission recognizes the importance of recruiting and
retaining qualified individuals. It has recommended improved basic
compensation and conditions of service, proficiency pay and accele-
rated promotions for the highly skilled to make military career
opportunities more attractive . These improvements , combined with an
intensive recruiting effort, should enable the military not only to
maintain a high quality force but also to have one that is more
experienced, better motivated, and has higher morale.
This study has not found contrary evidence to this rebuttal. However,
the recruiting policies of 1973 have been geared to a force-reduction
policy following the United States withdrawal from Vietnam and consequently
recruiters have had the privilege of selection to meet minimum, and often
maximum, quota limitations. This situation may have forced the average
scores for 1973 to a level higher than will be seen in the future. Then,
too, the short time span since the initiation of the All-Volunteer Force
policy is most likely insufficient to be indicative of the situation once
the system has begun to stabilize.
19

The contrast in recruit quota limitations for the Draft Lottery and
All-Volunteer periods can be seen by the comparison of tv.'o Recruiting
District Enlisted Goal Allocations letters. The first, Navy Recruiting
District San Francisco Notice 1130 dated M- August 1972, reflects the
typical quota system in effect throughout the pre-All-Volunteer Force
policy period. Enclosure (1) to this notice lists the First Term
Enlistee quota for the Southern Zone, which contains Monterey, Salinas,
and Gilroy, as 149 for the month of August 1973. This number was
determined by a nearly linear assignment of seven new recruits for each
recruiter throughout the zone. The quota, for the four recruiters
assigned to the Monterey, Salinas, and Gilroy stations, was set at
thirty new enlistees. No other special quality restrictions were given.
In comparison, a similar notice dated 29 March 1973 was issued to delineate
the requirements for April 1973. Paragraph 8, of that notice states:
"All first enlistmants must be school eligible and no Mental Group IV
applicants will be enlisted; this includes all USN and USNR recruits
and all minority categories. It is also desired that the number of
high school graduates be maximized. For clarification; to be considered
school eligible, A G+A=100, or G+A+M=151 is required. However, if a
man has test scores that qualify him for a school, he may be enlisted
in that school."
In addition, the .numerical limitations for the Southern Zone were
set at thirty (minimum and maximum) for First Term Enlistees, and at four
each for the AEF and NF programs (minimum). These zone figures were
assigned based on past performance records by area, population distribu-
tion, and personal recruiter strength assessments as evaluated by the
Headquarters staff personnel. Records of the specific rationale of each
assignment decision were not maintained.
Most Naval training and education programs strive to develop the
individual to a point where he will fit into the Navy's personnel pattern
with maximum effectiveness. To do this, the input selection process based
20

on past experience is used. This selection process preliminary excludes
those individuals whose educational and behaviorial background indicate
a reasonable probability of failure (See Odds for Effectiveness Table
for use with Navy Applicants for Enlistment, Appendix C). Even when the
standards are I'educed, as was the case during Project 100,000 initiated
in October 1966, the resulting distribution of the lesser qualified
enlistees (Cory 1971) showed that the Category IV men generally fit into
thirty-five ratings, all of which are outside the technical priority
ratings, and the retention rate for these men was substantially lower than
those for the other three Tiental groups
.
In the late 1940 *s when the Recruit Training Command output distribu-
tion showed only twenty percent of its graduates as direct input to
Class "A" schools and fifty percent going to direct in-service fleet
training (NAVPERS 10827 JAN 1949), a selection system could be more
tolerant of reduced standards. Todays quality standards for a smaller
more professional and specialized Navy are demanding that all enlistees
are Class "A" school qualified, and to the maximum extent possible all
enlistees are expected to be high school graduates. This is a luxury of
a system blessed with a high quality volunteer applicant supply curve.
"All available data suggest that the number of enlistees in AFQT
categories I, II, Ilia represents the true supply of these kinds
of enlistees, i.e., the Navy does not currently (1970) reject
significant numbers of physically fit applicants of this mental
caliber. " (Rhode 1972)
If the category Illb and IV personnel are to be the mainstay of
future recruiting potential under the All-Volunteer Force policy, future
revisions to minimum aptitude requirements for some technical schools
and modifications in training programs to accommodate lower aptitude




GAM AND AFQT CQPJ^LATION TABLE'>
GAM AFQT GAM AFQT GAM AFQT
164 66 120 17
163 65 119 16
162 61+ 118 15
161 62 117 15
160 61 116 14
159 59 115 1^1




156 56 112 12
155 54 111 12
154 53 110 11
153 52 109 11
152 50 108 11
151 49 107 10
150 48 106 10
149 47 105 9
148 45 104 9
147 44 103 8
146 42 102 7
145 41 101 5
144 40 100 4
143 39 99 3
142 38 98 2
141 37 97 1
140 36 96


































































"Naval Recruiting District, San
Francisco Notice 1130 of
26 December 1972
GAM = GCT+ARI+MECH


























*Naval Recruiting District, San Francisco




ODDS FOR EFFECTIVENESSTABLE FOR USE
WITH NAVY APPLICANTS FOR ENLISTMENT
Introduction
The Odds for Effectiveness (OFE) Table is for use as an aid m estimating the odds for n»al effectiveness for prospective first term enlistees. An effective sailor is defined as one wtto
completes fiis period of act-ve duty obtigation and is recommended for reenlisiment. The odds-for effectiveness xores are based upon the results of research conducted cwsr a period of yr. /ears
with a group of approximately 1 1,000 enlistees who entered the naval service in 19GQ. The Table was updated in 1968. The odds scores are the chances in lOG that an applicant, if enlisted, will
render effective ser;ice. To determine the odds score for a particular aoDhcant. start at the left-hand side of the table (m the column marked 'Test Score") and follow the line running to the
cfiaractcristics which describe his background. The score appearing in the last column is the applicant's odds for effectiveness. For example, if an applicant obtains an S3TB G * A + M score of
170, completed eleven years of schooling, and was expelled from school once, he would have 73 chances in 100 of rendering effective n^al service When an applicant attains a score enclosed
in a parenthesis (68 or belowl, a reevaluation miyrr be made and an OFE xore waiver in writing be entered m the enlisted service record of any such aiiplicants considered to be eligible for en-
listmenL It should be emphasized that the OFE Table is an aid for recruiters to rank applicants and select the best applicants for enlistment
Years Expuls
Test School and/or Arrests without
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